



THE CHONGQING NEGOTIATIONS

STUDY GUIDE HCCRI IX



HWA CHONG CONFLICT
RESOLUTION AND INQUIRY IX

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INTRODUCTION OF COMMITTEE

“There are decades where nothing happens; and there are weeks where decades happen.”

— Vladimir Ilyich Lenin¹

The above quote, often attributed to Lenin, the effervescent Marxist revolutionary, can be aptly used to describe many of the world’s major historical events. In 1919, when world leaders spent weeks and months drafting the Treaty of Versailles, observers were painfully aware that their decisions would impact civilisation for the subsequent few decades. In 1933, as Europe was mired in economic malaise, a skilful political manipulator named Adolf Hitler ascended to the position of Chancellor in a matter of weeks, forever changing the history of the continent. From the coup of Chilean Communist Salvador Allende in 1973, to the weeks of tension during the 1989 negotiations between Communists and trade unions in Poland, it is undeniable that there have been pivotal moments in the last century which have altered the fate of countries and their people. These moments deserve our attention not just for abstract academic reasons, but also because they have indelibly defined the lives of millions, including ours.

The weeks of August 1945 were one time period in which history was made. 26 years after the now-derided Treaty of Versailles was signed, 12 years after Hitler had risen to power, a mood of enthusiasm and trepidation had seized leaders of the Allied forces. Hitler’s forces had mostly been defeated, whilst US Commander-in-Chief Harry S. Truman had received news that his forces in Asia were close to victory. On August 6, in a military mission appropriately called Necessary Evil, an American B-29 Superfortress dropped the world’s

¹ Lenin, Vladimir. 1917. The State and Revolution. <https://www.marxists.org/ebooks/lenin/state-and-revolution.pdf>

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first atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima.² On August 16, the Japanese cabinet had resigned and their forces were decreed to cease fire. In China, where Communists and Nationalists had collaborated to counteract Japanese forces, the Southern Jiangsu and Xinghua campaigns had begun and led to even more bloodshed in a country in the wake of an already bloody war.³

August 1945 was a time of massive upheaval for all nations, recovering from the fatigue of six years of relentless fighting. On August 29, amidst this climate of change, the Chongqing (Chungking) Negotiations took place in China's provincial wartime capital. As the last Japanese forces left China, the Nationalist government and the Communist Party of China (CPC) engaged in 43 days of tense and unnerving negotiations. Famously the final meeting between Nationalist leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-Shek) and revolutionary Marxist leader Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-Tung), the Negotiations began with the aim of co-governance and discussing the possibility of a coalition government. While the Negotiations ended with the signing of the Double Tenth Agreement, which accepted Jiang's Guomindang (GMD, also known as Kuomintang) as the legitimate government of China, full-scale civil war resumed in 1946 and ended with the victory of the Communists in 1949.⁴

In order to understand China, now one of Asia's largest economic and political behemoths, one has to understand the historical conditions and factors which have influenced its development. This includes comprehending how the Communists, which remains as mainland China's incumbent government, managed to wrest power from its key ideological rival and emerge victorious from the Chinese Civil War. While there has been extensive and rich literature and research with regard to various aspects of the Chinese Civil War, such as the Northern Expedition and the Second United Front, the Chongqing Negotiations have not been covered to the same extent. However,

2 Atomic Heritage Foundation, n.d. "Hiroshima and Nagasaki Missions - Planes & Crews". <https://www.atomicheritage.org/history-page-type/bombings-hiroshima-and-nagasaki>

3 US Department of Energy, n.d. "Japan Surrenders". <https://www.osti.gov/opennet/manhattan-project-history/Events/1945/surrender.htm>

4 Perlez, Jane. 2015. "In Heat of August 1945, Mao and Chiang Met for the Last Time". The New York Times. November 4, 2015. <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/world/asia/the-last-time-mao-and-chiang-met.html>

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as many academics admit, the Chongqing Negotiations should be a crucial point of focus in order to understand the existing Communist leviathan and the sociopolitical situation in the world's largest dictatorship. Just as one cannot claim to understand China without first studying the legacy of the Boxer Rebellion, the ramifications of the Great Leap Forward, or the impacts of the One-Child Policy, the Chongqing Negotiations are imperative to comprehending the China of today.

Given that the Negotiations occurred amidst increasing suspicion and tension between the two major Cold War blocs, the Negotiations were layered with multiple geostrategic complexities and nuances that make for an interesting discussion. The Cold War, despite having ended three decades ago, continues to affect relations between nations, regional blocs, and world superpowers. Similarly, the Chongqing Negotiations, which occurred at a pivotal point in China's political life, is an important event that merits deeper investigation from delegates.

At HCCRI 2020, delegates will be representing the various Communist and Nationalist players that were present at the Negotiations, as well as various third-party actors representing the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, which were actively involved in the proceedings. Delegates are expected to discuss the Question of Post-Sino-Japanese War Settlements.

To be clear, delegates are neither expected, nor encouraged, to adhere to a strict plotline of how committee should progress. The purpose of the committee is not to blindly and fully mimic the actions and decisions of the diplomats at the Chongqing Negotiations. Rather, delegates are called to consider and imagine possible alternatives to how events have unfolded within the historical constraints. Given the sui generis nature of this council, delegates are highly encouraged to keep an open mind and adapt quickly to the circumstances and mechanics of the committee. It is the hope of the Dais that delegates do not approach the Negotiations unthinkingly, but use their stylistic flair, lobbying skills, and content knowledge to further the stance of their respective portfolios. This, the Dais believes, is and should be the core of Model United Nations.

I. NOTE ON THE USAGE OF NAMES

Historically, the Wade-Giles romanisation system has been the system of transcription throughout most of the Western world. Named for the sinologists Thomas F. Wade and Herbert A. Giles, this system has fallen out of favour in the People's Republic of China where the Pinyin system has become the official romanisation system. The International Organisation of Standardisation (ISO) and the United Nations (UN) both adopted the Pinyin system as the international standard during the 1980s. Today, the majority of students learning Mandarin as a first- and second-language use the Pinyin system.⁵

While both systems use the Latin alphabet, there are important differences in how consonants, vowels, and tones are represented. Another crucial difference is that the Wade-Giles system is based on the Nanjing pronunciation of words, rather than the Beijing pronunciation which has become more common since the 19th Century.⁶ Today, the Wade-Giles system is still used to refer to some proper nouns like locations and persons in Taiwan (e.g. Chinese founding father Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, the southern Taiwanese city of Kaohsiung). In mainland China, however, these nouns have fallen out of favour and have been replaced with Pinyin ones (e.g. the capital city being called 'Beijing' rather than 'Peking').

There has been criticism levelled at both romanisation systems, particularly at the accuracy and precision of their representations. While many historical figures continue to be known by their Wade-Giles romanised names (e.g. Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi being known as 'Chiang Kai-Shek'), the Dais will be adopting the Pinyin romanisation as opposed to the Wade-Giles one for this Study Guide and for the duration of the conference. This has been done for the purpose of maintaining parity with the current consensus among linguists, which prefer the more coherent and more commonly used Pinyin romanisation.⁷ Thus, when introducing a historical figure or place for the first time, we will be using the Pinyin romanisation with the Wade-Giles name used in parentheses, following which the Pinyin name will be used. Delegates are highly encouraged to use the Pinyin romanisation in their written submissions and speeches.

Additionally, in places which have seen a change in their name, the Dais will be using the name by which they are currently known today for the sake of clarity and consistency. Therefore, we will be using 'Manchuria' as opposed to the dated 'Manchukuo', and 'Singapore' vis-a-vis 'Syonan-To'. The Dais will also be abstaining from language that is now considered dated. For instance, the Study Guide will utilise the term

⁵ Pletcher, Kenneth, n.d. "Wade-Giles Romanization". Encyclopaedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Wade-Giles-romanization>

⁶ Egerod, Soren Christian, n.d. "Chinese Languages". Encyclopaedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Chinese-languages>

⁷ Ibid.

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'Communist world' as opposed to 'third world', for the latter has already fallen out of academic favour and common use. Additionally, for the purposes of clear writing, we will be using the term 'Nationalists' to refer to the Guomindang (GMD), and 'Communists' to refer to the Communist Party of China (CPC).

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: CHINESE CIVIL WAR

“Let China sleep, when she wakes up she will
shake the world.”
— French military leader Napoleon Bonaparte⁸

This section will seek to cover the critical historical events and trends in the Chinese Civil War during the lead-up to the Chongqing Negotiations. This section will go through the Chinese Civil War in its various phases, starting with the roots of the conflict in the Qing Dynasty and ending with the Chongqing Negotiations in 1945. The Dais will also briefly discuss the outcomes of the Chongqing Negotiations and this will be followed by a section covering the international background to the issues at hand.

THE QING DYNASTY (1644-1911)

The Qing (Ch'ing) Dynasty was the last monarchical regime to rule over China. Due to the limitations of this Study Guide, we will not be engaging in an in-depth examination of the Qing period, but rather taking a bird's-eye view of its key features. Unlike the Ming Dynasty that preceded it, the Qing Dynasty bloodline came from a non-Han minority known as the Manchus. While

this Study Guide will not go into great depth to discuss China under Qing rule, it is important for delegates to note that the Qing Dynasty declined precipitously during the 19th Century. When the reign of the ambitious and ruthless Napoleon ended in 1815, the general consensus in Europe was that China was backward relative to their own civilisation.⁹ Although the early Qing rulers were able to expand China's territory and solidify its international position in peripheral countries like Korea and Vietnam, the Qing government began to be plagued with endemic corruption and inefficiency. Its weakness became clear during the Opium Wars, when the Chinese were forced to lease their ports to the United Kingdom in a series of deeply unequal treaties. During the 1890s, when China lost its possession of Taiwan to Japan after the First Sino-Japanese War, it became apparent to many that the Qing Dynasty was in its moribund stages.¹⁰

⁸ Fish, Isaac Stone. 2016. "Crouching Tiger, Sleeping Giant". Foreign Policy Magazine. January 19, 2016. https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/19/china_shakes_the_world_cliche/

⁹ Zhao, Gang. 2006. "Reinventing China: Imperial Qing Ideology and the Rise of Modern Chinese National Identity in the Early Twentieth Century". *Modern China*, Vol. 32, No. 1. January 2006. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20062627>

¹⁰ Pong, David. 2013. "The Fall of the Qing, 1840-1912". April 22, 2013. Oxford Bibliographies. <https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199920082/obo-9780199920082-0029.xml>

There is a long history of internal dissatisfaction at the Qing government, the Taiping Rebellion of the 1850s and the Boxer Rebellion of 1899 being the most famous examples. The Qing Dynasty, however, was eventually overthrown by Dr. Sun Zhongshan (Dr. Sun Yat-Sen). A Western-educated medical professional, supported by a strong network of overseas Chinese, Sun was immensely successful at bringing down the Qing Dynasty during the 1911 Xinhai Revolution. His promise of revitalising China through a Republican system of government, and of severely limiting the influence of Western imperial powers on China, found deep support among many disaffected Chinese persons. During the period of the Chinese Civil War, and even till today, both the Communists and the Nationalists revere Sun as a Chinese patriot and inspirational figure.¹¹

THE XINHAI REVOLUTION TO THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC (1911-1921)

Sun, having grown up in the American territory of Hawai'i and lived in Europe, was deeply inspired by the Western model of a constitutional, federal democracy. He was intent on restructuring the Chinese political system in close alignment to the American one, with regular fair elections and universal suffrage. He was also intent on adopting some features of British parliamentary democracy, such as the concept of a bicameral parliament.¹²

Despite expectations that China would flourish into a Western-style liberal

democracy, Sun's vision was never realised. This was not least due to his relinquishing of power to military dictator Yuan Shikai (Yuan Shi-Kai), which caused the subsequent fracturing of China into many warring states. Throughout China, regions were ruled by different warlords which engaged in exploitative and feudalistic behaviour. In 1915, Yuan tried to restore hereditary monarchy to China, which led to his being deposed by oppositional forces. With China's advancement towards liberal democracy coming to a standstill and its people deeply divided, it was not until 1927 that China was again reunited under Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi.¹³

In the same time period, a different political trend took root in Europe. In parallel with China's decline into warlordism, Communism was becoming a stronger sociopolitical force throughout the European continent. First developed by theorists Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx in 1848, Communism emphasised the existence of massive class divides in society and the necessity of a global proletarian revolution. In 1917, Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, who presided over the largest empire in the world, was brought down by Communists known as Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks subsequently took control of the government in the October Revolution. Following a long-drawn civil war with the Tsar's former supporters and anti-Bolshevik forces, the Communists emerged victorious in 1922 and established the world's first socialist state, the Soviet Union. Influenced by the Bolsheviks' commitment to egalitarianism, Communist parties started

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Spence, Jonathan. 1999. *The Search for Modern China*. New York and London: W. W. Norton.

¹³ Fairbank, John K., and Kwang-Ching Liu. 2008. *The Cambridge History of China*. Cambridge University Press

to gain traction in Germany, Hungary, and Poland, where poverty was rife and social welfare was poor.¹⁴

Some Chinese thinkers were also influenced by Communism, including a young Mao Zedong. A number of intellectuals, including Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, found Communism to be a groundbreaking ideology, and saw it as an uplifting school of thought for oppressed peoples throughout the world. Mao, then a delegate from a Hunan Communist group, was present at the party's birth in the Shanghai French Concession in 1921.¹⁵ Chen, Li, and Mao were all enthralled with the beliefs of Lenin, the leader of the Bolsheviks, who saw working-class intellectuals like themselves as the vanguard of any socialist movement. While only around 50 to 60 persons were active Communist members at its founding, we would observe that the Communists will grow into one of the most formidable opponents of the Nationalists in the matter of a decade.

THE FOUNDING OF THE CPC TO THE APRIL 12TH INCIDENT (1921-27)

Sun, like Mao, was also affected by the 1917 Russian Revolution. While maintaining his commitment to Western liberal democracy, Sun believed that restructuring the Nationalists into a disciplined party was necessary for him to revitalise his party. Sun, who looked to Soviet aid, was encouraged by the

Soviet Party Secretary Joseph Stalin to adopt a strategic partnership with the Communists. In 1923, both the Nationalists and the Communists agreed to the First United Front. This was supported by the Soviet revolutionary Mikhail Markovich Borodin, who led the negotiations regarding the incorporation of the Communists into the Nationalist's party. Comintern (Communist International), an international organisation advocating world Communism, was also highly supportive of this alliance.¹⁶

While both parties were united by their goal to reunite China and end warlordism, the relationship was tense from the beginning. The Nationalists were intent on using the alliance to obtain Soviet aid, while the Communists sought to subvert the Nationalist party from within and expand their influence. This tension continued even during the Northern Expedition, which was undertaken by the Nationalists to reunify China. Sun, who passed away in 1925, was unable to lead the Expedition. Jiang Jieshi, an esteemed lieutenant during the Xinhai Revolution, was chosen to lead the expedition instead.¹⁷

Jiang's Nationalists and the Communists collaborated closely during this Expedition. The Nationalists used their supplies to strengthen the Northern Expedition's forces, while Communist underground agents were responsible for mobilising workers and peasants for Jiang.¹⁸ The

¹⁴ McMeekin, Sean. 2017. *The Russian Revolution: A New History*. Basic Books.

¹⁵ Pepper, Suzanne. 1999. *Civil War in China: The Political Struggle*. University of California Press.

¹⁶ Garver, John. 1988. *Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism*. Oxford University Press.

¹⁷ Taylor, Jay. 2009. *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-Shek and the Struggle for Modern China*. Harvard University Press.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

alliance, however, was short-lived. On April 12, 1927, when the reunification of China was largely complete, Jiang led a purge of Communist members that led to the expulsion of almost all left-wingers from the Nationalist party. While this came as a huge blow to the Communists at the time, many historians observe that this was inevitable in hindsight. Jiang, a right-winger, was deeply critical and suspicious of left-wing philosophy, and had financial links to banks and wealthy individuals who were paranoid about Communism. This purge, now known widely as the April 12 Massacre or the Shanghai Massacre, led to the beginning of the First Chinese Revolutionary Civil War between the Communists and the Nationalists.¹⁹

After the April 12 Massacre, the left-wing branch of the Nationalists maintained the alliance with the Communists while Jiang became increasingly hostile. The subterranean tension between the Communists and the Nationalists devolved into mass violence, leading to a period termed as the First Chinese Revolutionary Civil War. The party leadership of the Communists was forced out of Shanghai and effectively sidelined to the remote parts of China, where Mao, the Communist leader, and Sichuanese General Zhu De (Chu Teh) founded the Jiangxi Soviet in 1931.²⁰

From 1931 to 1934, the Nationalists launched a total of five encirclement campaigns against the Communists. The

Communists were forced to abandon the Jiangxi Soviet as their resources could not match the prowess of Jiang's military might. Between 1934 and 1935, the Nationalists pursued the Communists into Shanxi, an area in the western interior of China. This military pursuit, known as the Long March, has been covered extensively in the popular culture of both the East and the West, and played a crucial role in solidifying the popularity of the Communists with the people of China. The peasantry in China were inspired by the discipline and compassion of Communist forces, who were specifically instructed by Mao to treat peasants with respect and kindness. This contrasts sharply with their attitudes towards Jiang and his party. The Nationalists' model of conscription in the regions that they controlled, and the mistreatment and abuse of civilians, led to increasing dissatisfaction with them among the general populace.²¹

During this time, Mao emerged as the indisputable leader of the Communists. While Zhu was previously seen as the most senior member of the Communists, Mao consolidated his support within the Communists with his rhetoric and leadership style. His adversity in the face of the struggle, which saw their forces being reduced by 90% during the Long March, led to respect for him among the party's rank-and-file members. It was also during this time that Zhou Enlai, another significant figure to the Chongqing Negotiations, gained prestige and power within the Communist ranks.²²

¹⁹ Lary, Diana. 2007. *China's Republic*. Cambridge University Press.

²⁰ Dillion, Michael. 1992. "Fang Zhimin, Jingdezhen and the Northeast Jiangxi Soviet: Tradition, Revolution and Civil War in a Pottery Town", *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 3. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/312554?seq=1>

²¹ Salisbury, Harrison. 1985. *The Long March*. McGraw-Hill.

²² *Ibid.*

THE SECOND SINO-JAPANESE WAR (1937-45)

The conflict between the Communists and the Nationalists ceased briefly between 1937 and 1945, when both parties collaborated to defend China from Japanese invaders. After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937, which was a heated dispute between the Japanese Imperial Army and Nationalist forces, Japanese and Chinese troops escalated into battle. Although there had been a Japanese presence in Manchuria since 1931 and multiple skirmishes between the Japanese and the Chinese, 1937 marked the first year that full-scale fighting took place.²³ The 8 years of fighting the Japanese is known by many as the Second Sino-Japanese War, although it is also sometimes referred to as 'the Asian Holocaust' due to the high death toll.

During the second period of collaboration, some historians argue that the Communists gained an advantage by making use of the Nationalists' preoccupation with the Japanese to advance their own position in China.²⁴ Historians support this claim by observing that the Communists rarely engaged the Japanese in conventional battles, ensuring that their losses remained minimal. While there were times when the Communists and the Nationalists did support each other mutually, such as during the Hundred Regiments Offensive in 1940, suspicion and distrust remained a thematic concern during the Second

United Front. In January 1941, clashes took place between the Communists and the Nationalists at Anhui in what is today known as the New Fourth Army Incident. While the Communists view the cause of the clashes at Anhui as 'Nationalist treachery', the Nationalists stated that they were instigated by Communist insubordination and betrayal.²⁵ The falling out of the Communists and the Nationalists in 1941 marked the end of the collaboration between the two parties and sets the backdrop for the Chongqing Negotiations, when the Communists and the Nationalists discussed the renewed possibility of a coalition government and joint military forces. In the following sections, we will discuss the context of post-war negotiations leading up to the Chongqing Negotiations, as well as how the negotiations eventually unfolded.

²³ Mitter, Rana. 2013. *China's War with Japan, 1937-1945: The Struggle for Survival*. Penguin United Kingdom.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, The, n.d. "Second Sino-Japanese War". Encyclopaedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/event/Second-Sino-Japanese-War>

III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: LOCAL CONTEXT

At the end of World War II, the Communists and the Nationalists emerged as the two biggest contenders for power in China. The uneasy alliance that both parties had agreed to form in the face of the Japanese had broken down all but in name since the New Fourth Army incident. Most expected that the civil war would pick up from its suspension in 1937 once the Japanese surrendered, and the Communists were no exception. As mentioned previously, the Communists had taken the opportunity to rebuild its forces and expand its territory during the Sino-Japanese War. With a strong base in the Shaanxi province, the Communists had managed to obtain a vast sphere of influence in north and central China, with nineteen Communist base areas. This “Liberated Zone” made up one-quarter of the country’s territory and one-third of its population, and included many important towns and cities. By Mao’s estimate, the Communists controlled a population of 95 million, and their main force had grown to 1.2 million troops, backed with additional militia of 2 million.²⁶

The Nationalists still outnumbered the Communists greatly, with approximately three million troops as opposed to the one million Communist soldiers. However, the war had weakened the KMT, as being

the legal Chinese government meant the party and its troops had to bear the brunt of the Japanese offensives. Still, the war had allowed the Nationalists to achieve international recognition and support from the United States, which had been its ally during the war.²⁷

The political tension and ideological conflict between the two parties had not abated. Back in 1936, in the wake of the critical Xi’an incident, Zhou Enlai had agreed terms set out by Chiang Kai-Shek in the understanding that GMD would then agree to fight the Japanese, which included the following:

1. The Chinese Communist Party should observe the Three People’s Principles.
2. The Communists should obey the orders of the Generalissimo.
3. The Red Army should be abolished;²⁸

While the CPC had little intention of following such terms now that the war was over, they remained the demands and expectations of the GMD. The GMD were expectantly waiting for an opportunity to arise in which the CPC would stage a general uprising and openly rebel, already highly distrustful of the other party. In a secret brochure issued by the GMD in May 1945, the GMD accused the CPC of

²⁶ Friedman, Edward, Joffe, Ellis, et al. “The Chinese Red Army, 1927–1963: An Annotated Bibliography”. Harvard East Asian Monographs, Vol. 16, Ed. 1. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1tg5nnd>

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Cuchissi, Jennifer. 2002. “The Causes and Effects of the Chinese Civil War, 1927-1949”. Seton Hall University Dissertations and Theses. <https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi>

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“secretly expand[ing] and strengthen[ing] their forces”, calling its “stubbornness and insubordination...clear evidence of preparations for a rebellion”.²⁹

As for the CPC, the Communists had managed to concretise their political ideology and enshrine “Mao Zedong thought” in the party constitution over the duration of the war. It was also no more willing to back down to the KMT. In April 1945, Mao Zedong defined the Communists’ foreign policy for the post-war world, announcing that “China can never win genuine independence and equality by following the present policy of the Kuomintang government.”³⁰ It is clear that neither party saw any room or allowance for the other, and envisioned a China with a single dominant party ruling—their own.

²⁹ Goldberg, Gary, n.d. “The Communist Party of China over the Last 10 Years: A Secret Brochure of the GMD Issued on 1 May 1945”. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. f.17, op.128, d. 824. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121822.pdf>

³⁰ Mao, Zedong. 1961. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 3. Peking: Foreign Languages Press. pp. 203-270. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121326>

IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

“When diplomacy ends, war begins.”
— Adolf Hitler³¹

China’s broiling internal conflict had not gone unnoticed by the rest of the world. The international context to the Chongqing Negotiations is just as important as the domestic tensions between the Communists and the Nationalists. Cold War superpower politics between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union, which have extensive roots in ideology, played a huge role in what unfolded in Chongqing. This section will also cover the breakdown of the relationship between the US and the Soviets, the nature of foreign involvement in the negotiations and the role they played in the proceedings.

US-SOVIET UNION RELATIONS

The US and the Soviet Union have had a chequered history, though the mood of their relationship has often been tense. Before the 1917 Russian Revolution, the Tsar had been allies with the US for decades as they both shared mutual interests. When the Tsar was toppled by Bolsheviks, the US aided Tsarists in pursuit of deposing the Communists in the Soviet Union, though this was ultimately unsuccessful as foreign support made the anti-Communist movement unpopular with locals. This

tension between the Americans and the Soviets would set the stage for the next few decades of fraughtness between the two superpowers. While the relationship between the two has dominated most of the post-World War II landscape, this section will not go into great detail due to the limitations of length. Additional readings for delegates wanting to learn more will be listed at the end of this Study Guide.

The US, as a capitalist, democratic state, was naturally suspicious of the Leninist-Marxist ideologies of the Soviet Union’s leaders. Soviet politician Leon Trotsky, for instance, was a fierce advocate for a global revolution by the international workforce, a prospect that scared not just American corporate lobbies and politicians, but also voters and social groups. During World War II, when the US and the Soviet Union collaborated to fight Nazi Germany, tensions continued to remain. Hitler, whose famous quote begins this section, was convinced that their relationship would not last. The US chastised the Soviet Union for its alliance with the Nazis in the early stages of the war, while the Soviets believed that

²¹ Freeman, Chas W., Marks, Sally, n.d. “Diplomacy”. Encyclopaedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/diplomacy>

American President Franklin D. Roosevelt was deliberately delaying the opening of a Second Front in the hopes that the Nazis would wear out Soviet forces.

By the end of World War II, Stalin's main directive was to create a strong bulwark in Eastern Europe to prevent another invasion from the west, just as what had occurred during the winter of 1941. Stalin was intent on extending the Soviet sphere of influence into countries such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia. This was antithetical to the American government's interests, which were to prevent more countries from becoming satellite states of the Soviets. However, during the London Foreign Ministers conference in July, the Soviet Union was unable to settle on favourable terms for herself. The conference, which involved China, France, the United Kingdom, and the US, was marred with disagreement about how Japan should be governed after World War II. This led to little matters of substance being accomplished, and made the Soviet Union intent on making China a bargaining chip. Historians regard the failure of the London Conference for Stalin as his main motivation for entering the Chongqing Negotiations.

SOVIET UNION'S RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNISTS AND THE NATIONALISTS

At first glance, one might expect that the Soviet Union would lend her full support to the Communists given their ideological proximity. However, this was hardly the case for most of the history of relations between the Communists, the Nationalists, and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union sent advisors to both the Communists and the Nationalists,

the latter of which was structured on Leninist lines, as we saw in the previous section. Following the April 12 Massacre, when the Communist cells in major cities were eliminated and forced to flee to the countryside, the Communists were weakened severely and the Soviets saw it as more strategic to collaborate with the Nationalists.

In this period, the Soviets' strategic imperative was to stymie Japan's territorial ambitions. Although Stalin and Hitler had developed a Non-Aggression Pact, and Hitler was an ally of Japan's, Stalin was paranoid about the possibility of a strong and militarily bellicose Japan in the Far East. (The port of Vladivostok, for instance, was vulnerable to an attack from the Japanese Navy across the Sea of Japan). Given that the Nationalists were the legitimate government of China at the time, and had more territorial control and artillery, it was in Stalin's interest to collaborate with Jiang's forces. From 1937 to 1941, at the height of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Stalin supplied the Nationalists with more than 100 tanks, 14,000 machine guns, and 1,200 airplanes, in addition to other military-grade weaponry and equipment. In the Soviet Union's cinemas, Stalin allowed for the screening of films which glorified Jiang, lionising him as a 'Red General' who was furthering the interests of the Soviet government.

The Communists were naturally unhappy with Stalin's implicit endorsement of the Nationalists. Mao himself was personally offended by how the Soviets had continually tried to force an alliance between the Communists and the Nationalists. On August 14, 1945, the Sino-

Soviet Treaty of Friendship was signed between Stalin and Jiang, an agreement that, on paper, prohibited the Soviets from aiding the Communists. At the time, Stalin had expected the Nationalists to win over the Communists and thus wanted to solidify its relationship with the Nationalists before the civil war ended and force out potential territorial concessions. Mao was incensed that Stalin was not committed to a global proletarian revolution, and how Soviet personnel told him to stave off seizing power from the Nationalists.

Many historians would suggest that the ideal scenario for Stalin would have been a coalition government in China between the two political organisations. In such a case, Stalin would maintain a degree of influence over policy through Comintern and the withholding of aid and supplies. This was crucial for the Soviets, who sought to expand their territory into Mongolia (then known as Tuvan Urankhai, a name dating from the Mongol Empire). Stalin was always suspicious of a Communist China. With a fully Communist political party in power, China would be in competition with the Soviet Union for leadership in the Communist world. Stalin saw that China not only had a massively larger population than his own Soviet Union, but also that China had an ideological conception of Communism that was much more palatable to underdeveloped parts of the world. Whilst Stalin and his predecessor Lenin had always emphasised the importance of an urban vanguard revolution, it was Mao's view that a revolution had to come from the peasant, rural population of any nation. This interpretation was more palatable to the majority of countries in the East – like

Cambodia, Korea, and Vietnam – where the peasant population far outnumbered the urban poor.

Ergo, the Soviets entered the Chongqing Negotiations with a complex decision-making calculus. Whilst closer to the Communists from an ideological vantage point, the Soviets were bound to an alliance with the Nationalists through its Treaty of Friendship. This tension of interests would dominate the Soviet delegates at the conference, and would influence the course of events to an extremely large extent.

AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNISTS AND THE NATIONALISTS

The US was a major player in the Pacific Theatre during World War II. While the US was decidedly uninvolved in events in the European Theatre at the onset of the war, she was eventually drawn into the battle with Japan in the Pacific following the Pearl Harbor attacks. After the Hiroshima atomic bombing, followed by the Nagasaki atomic attack, the Japanese military was soundly defeated and the US gained control over a large part of Asia. US five-star General Douglas MacArthur, while technically bound to the White House by legislative procedure, had almost full jurisdiction over 80 million people – including Japan, the Philippines, and a large part of the Korean peninsula.

For most of American history, the US has taken a laissez-faire approach to international relations. Except for the tenure of Woodrow Wilson, most US Presidents prior to 1941 had an isolationist approach to foreign relations. This was not merely a feature of the US's Executive

branch, as the legislature was also fiercely opposed to international collaboration for most of the US's political life. In 1920, for example, the US Congress refused to approve Wilson's proposal for the US to join the League of Nations, a huge blow to peace and prosperity at the time. However, in 1945, the global context had changed to the extent that the US could not afford to disengage from international affairs.

With World War II, the US found herself in the position where it was forced to intervene militarily in China. Towards the end of World War II, the Americans were growing anxious about the probable resumption of the Chinese civil war, which would undermine anti-Japanese war efforts. Given the new geopolitical state of affairs, they were also worried about the possibility of a Communist China, and dispatched the Dixie Mission with the goal of investigating the Communists. John S. Service, a top diplomat, was responsible for a great amount of political analysis on the Communists. While Service had expected that he would find the Communists to be corruptly organised in the same way many Americans saw the Soviets, he found that the Communists could be a reliable ally, especially in alliance with the Nationalists. In fact, Service found that the Communists were more efficient and energetic than the Nationalists and was impressed by the bravery of Communist units during guerilla raids, a finding that had him fired from his government vocation due to the suspicion that he was a Communist.

In 1944, Major General Patrick J. Hurley, a former Secretary of War, flew to Yan'an (Yan'an) with the aim of "unify[ing] all the military forces in China for the purpose

of defeating Japan". Supported by the Dixie Mission, Hurley also had findings as surprising as Service's. He concluded that the ideological gulf between the Communists and the Nationalists was not as large as other analysts in the Pentagon had anticipated. He compared it to the difference between the Democrats and the Republicans, which in the 1940s was not as polarised as it is today, and found the idea of an alliance extremely attractive. From the American perspective, such an alliance would not only dilute the influence of Communists in the Chinese political system, but also create a useful ally in the emerging bipolar world. The Hurley Mission failed initially, but Hurley did not lose sight of his conviction in a union between the Communists and the Nationalists, and would stay and go on to mediate the future negotiations at Chongqing in August 1945.

CONCLUSION

This section began with the quote: 'When diplomacy ends, war begins'. This quote could not be more relevant than with the emerging context of 1945, when a failure to reach a consensus in Chongqing could mean direct conflict between the Communists and the Nationalists. Furthermore, although both the Soviet Union and the US had common interests in Chongqing, the breakdown of diplomacy between the two burgeoning world hegemonies is key to how the negotiations would take place. Although both were for the broad idea of an alliance, their contradictory motivations meant that the way they wanted the negotiations conducted would differ. Which party should have control over the military, or which party should have more decision-making power, for instance, were matters that the Soviet Union and the US disagreed upon heatedly.

V. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE CHONGQING NEGOTIATIONS

This section will briefly describe how the negotiations unfolded. The Dais would like to explicitly elucidate that this section is not meant to be a blueprint for how delegates should approach committee debate. On the contrary, it is merely intended to give delegates a succinct overview of how the Chongqing Negotiations took place. Delegates are not allowed to explicitly reference events that occurred throughout the actual Negotiations, though they are encouraged to use it to observe the clashes in interests and incentives between the various stakeholders.

CHONGQING NEGOTIATIONS

Following Japan's surrender on August 16, 1945, Jiang invited Mao to journey to Chongqing. However, Jiang never had the true intention to seek peace with the Communists. He had made it clear to both his cadre and his diplomats that whatever occurred in Chongqing was meant to be no more than a public relations exercise. As for Mao, he saw the Chongqing Negotiations as advantaging him in buying time for the Communists to consolidate and expand their control, and, when the time was right, go into full military action. Mao was firm in his belief that the final product of the negotiations would be insignificant due to the difficulties of enforcing it, and thus be unimportant in his blueprint for domination over the Nationalists.

Zhou Enlai, then already a high-ranking member of the Communist cadre, was an important partaker in the negotiations. Zhou termed Mao's and his worldview as

the "fight fight, talk talk" strategy. With this in mind, the Communists eventually accepted Jiang's invitation, and Patrick J. Hurley personally escorted him to Chongqing, the government's wartime capital, from his own at Yen-an.

At this point, it is prudent for the Dais to inform the delegates that while the personal motives of the CPC and the GMD cannot be ignored and are crucial to the historical realism of the council, each delegate's individual portfolio allows for more flexibility in terms of their stance. More pertinently, the integrity towards the process of negotiations should not be lost in the midst of council debate. Delegates should understand that seeking compromise and alternative solutions are still viable options as long as the bigger picture is always kept in mind.

ONGOING DEVELOPMENTS

The Japanese had invaded Manchuria in 1931 and subsequently occupied the region until 1945.

In the last month of the Second World War, the Soviet Union launched the huge Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation against the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria. This offensive decimated the Kwantung Army in three weeks and left Soviet forces occupying all of Manchuria by the end of the war, resulting in a total power vacuum of local Chinese forces. Later in the year Chiang Kai-shek realized that he would not have sufficient resources to prevent a Communist takeover of Manchuria when the Soviets withdrew as scheduled. He

therefore asked the Soviets to delay their withdrawal until he had relocated enough of his best-trained men and technology into Manchuria. However, the Soviets refused permission for the Nationalist troops to trespass its territory. Nationalist troops were then airlifted by the US to occupy key cities in North China, while the countryside was already dominated by the Communists. On 15 November 1945, the GMD began a campaign to prevent the Communists from strengthening its already strong base. The Soviets spent the extra time systematically dismantling the extensive Manchurian industrial base (worth up to \$2 billion) and shipping it back to their war-ravaged country.

RESULTS

The Negotiations lasted for seven weeks. Representatives from both sides talked about their vision for a new, democratic China; and discussed the possibility of a national conference that would set out the rules for elections to a national assembly. What was more, they also proposed for all Chinese forces to be brought together under Jiang's command. The result was the Double-Tenth Agreement, wherein the Nationalists and the Communists recognised the other's legitimacy as government and opposition party respectively, and planned to form a coalition government in the hopes of avoiding another civil war. On the 11th of October, 1945, Mao departed from Chongqing. It would be the last time Mao and Jiang ever saw each other.

Neither party took the Double Tenth Agreement seriously—Mao described it as “a mere scrap of paper”. The Communists

refused to give up the territory it recovered from the Japanese, nor did it allow its army to be integrated under Jiang. Faced with such, Jiang refused to consider a coalition government with the Communists.

By 1946, full-scale civil war would resume. In 1949, the Nationalists would be defeated and Jiang would flee to Taiwan. Mao would establish the communist People's Republic of China, and rule from the restored capital of Beijing.

VI. SCOPE OF DEBATE

In the course of debate, delegates are expected to debate the following topics (in no order of importance):

FORM OF GOVERNANCE

The form of governance that China would adopt was a key part of the Chongqing Negotiations. Given that the Communists and the Nationalists laid at the opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, the manner of governance that would be adopted mattered heavily for both parties. Both parties considered the conceptualisation of a coalition government, in which both parties shared power within the government, naturally with multiple merits and disadvantages for both the Communists and the Nationalists. This was supported by the USSR, which saw the Communists as a threat to their leadership within the Communist world and the Nationalists as being ideologically impure. However, there were factions within both parties that heavily resisted a coalition.

In addition to having to decide how to split the political power in China, deciding how to divide power within military ranks is another concern. Finally, being able to implement and enforce the decisions made during the Negotiations is a crucial aspect of discussion in this Committee.

CONTESTED AREAS AND TERRITORY

As with any war, territory was an important concern for the Communists and the Nationalists. Large territory meant the ability to draw from conscripts in the population and to requisition food for military aims. In China, with its rich agricultural and industrial heartlands, territorial disputes have been massively important since the days of Han rule. During the Chinese Civil War, the Communist base of operations and support was located in the western interior of the country, while the Nationalists were strongest along the eastern coast and urban areas. The Communists, with their dominance in rural areas and thus their ability to sever communications between different Nationalist-controlled cities, was able to emerge victorious due to their effective control of territory. At the Chongqing Negotiations, the nineteen territories of China were considered for distribution. In this committee, delegates will need to consider the geostrategic impacts of their actions, and how to divide territory to achieve their goals.

(SEE NEXT PAGE FOR REFERENCE MAP OF TERRITORIES)

TOPIC: THE CHONGQING NEGOTIATIONS




FIGURE 1: AREAS UNDER JAPANESE OCCUPATION NEAR THE END OF THE WAR AND COMMUNIST BASES

INDUSTRY AND INFRASTRUCTURE

China was “grimly” determined to speed up its pace of industrialisation following the war. After long periods of economic stagnation during the period of warlordism and the Second Sino-Japanese War, China’s economic capacity could not match other economies which had advanced greatly and quickly following the Industrial Revolution. Despite China’s abundance of human resources, her productivity levels and industrial output could not match that of the US or the Soviet Union, not to mention other countries of smaller population size.

China’s economy was primarily agrarian, with a focus on agricultural activity that yielded crops for consumption. The war, having drastically reduced the influence of manufacturers and other modern enterprises, also gravely impacted China’s economic prospects. Delegates will have to work around the “agrarian problem”,³² posit agrarian reforms, and decide on the steps China should take to modernise and industrialise her economy. Whether China is to prioritise heavy or light industry, the extent of government versus private control, and the possibility of loans and foreign enterprise are all issues to be debated on. Delegates are

³² Referring to China’s deleterious overreliance on agricultural activity

encouraged to exercise both imagination and historical realism in their discussion of these issues. Delegates should situate themselves within the context of the times, and evaluate whether or not their solutions are feasible given the economic slowdown in the wake of World War II.

Another key aspect of the discussion is China's infrastructure, which was in critical condition by 1945. To begin with, China had very few roads, and rail networks were few and far between. The invasion from Japanese forces resulted in the destruction of even more transportation networks, plunging an already damaged economy into greater paralysis. Of the estimated US\$380 billion in damage done during the war, a large part came from Japan's destruction of key roads and bridges that served as supply lines for the Second United Front. Delegates will have to find ways to establish an infrastructure network that will enable the movement of goods and people, and allow for the growth of an industrial sector.

Manchuria had been the industrial heartland of China until it was occupied by the Japanese in 1931. Manchuria was and still largely is rich in resources, including but not limited to iron, coking coal, soybeans, and salt, which were coveted by the Japanese in the 1930s. These resources were just as important in 1945, when any plan to rejuvenate the Chinese economy required these essential ingredients. When the Soviets invaded Manchuria in August 1945 as part of its declaration of war against the Japanese, they began systematically stripping the region bare of industry. With Manchuria expected to play a key role in

post-war industrialisation, the problem of Manchuria must also be discussed and settled.

COLD WAR AND FOREIGN POLICY

Most critically, the Cold War context underpinning the duration of the Negotiations cannot be ignored, and must serve more as a contributing factor for delegates to consider throughout rather than an issue to be solved.

While the Cold War itself had arguably not yet begun in 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union were emerging as competing world superpowers following the end of World War II. Where China stands in the midst of the two giants must be navigated by delegates in council, especially seeing as both countries had sent representatives, and had active stakes in the Negotiations—with the American attempt to mediate the conflict and the Soviet aim to pave a middle road for China. At the end of the day, delegates should not neglect the ideological clash at the root of the Communist-Nationalist conflict.

VII. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

COALITION GOVERNMENT

A coalition government was one of the key solutions proposed to resolve the civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists. It was supported by Stalin and his Soviet government for political reasons, who wanted the Chinese government to have a Communist presence but were suspicious of the Communists' ideological programme. It was also viewed favourably by the Americans. President Harry S. Truman, who viewed stopping the spread of Communism as his primary geopolitical directive, saw a coalition government as a mechanism to stop the inevitable victory of the Communists in a long-drawn conflict. The British and the French, which were largely aligned with Truman's foreign policy, regarded the coalition government as a way of protecting democracy in China. There were also concerns about whether or not a democracy could be properly established in China, given the dramatic failure of Sun's vision of constitutional democracy in the 1920s. Just as during that time period, there were concerns that liberal democratic processes in China would devolve into authoritarianism, leaving only the facade of democracy.

However, within the Communist and the Nationalist camps, there were fervent disagreements with regard to the coalition government. While there were some who regarded compromising as the sole method of ensuring their parties' success, there were others who felt that the solution was impossible.

Neither Jiang nor Mao believed that the other was willing to relinquish power. More notably, Mao felt with certainty that a coalition government would strip him of any real power. However, it is up to the delegates to navigate within their portfolio powers whether a parliamentary coalition government can actually be feasibly proposed and established.

POST-WAR REPARATIONS

Demanding financial reparations from Japan can help ease the economic burden of China's post-war reconstruction, but whether China will prioritise such a solution or deem it practical must be decided upon by the delegates. Reparations can be sought out through requesting Japan to surrender of all its investments, properties and material assets in China, or for Japan to deliver a significant portion of its machinery for heavy industry to assist China's industrialisation and to justly hinder Japan's efforts at rebuilding its own armament industry.

VIII. QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER

Is there a point in reconciling the Nationalists and the Communists? If so, how should their tense relationship be ameliorated?

How should China resolve its territorial and regional disputes?

To what extent should third-parties, such as the US and the Soviet Union, be involved in the Chongqing negotiations?

How should China restructure its industry and economy going forward? How should she focus her limited resources in a beneficial way?

IX. CONCLUSION

The Chongqing Negotiations occurred in a pivotal period of China's modern history. With China fragile in the wake of a brutal war, a civil conflict not yet resolved, and the prospect of a greater internal struggle looming on the horizon—the potential for these Negotiations to change the course of history cannot be understated. While in actuality the Negotiations may have failed to achieve concrete effect, the Dais hopes that HCCRI 2020 will give delegates a chance to explore the workings and complications of negotiation, and that delegates will seek to arrive at a conclusion driven by the power of diplomacy and compromise.

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